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SECURING AUTHORITY:

The View from the Top
By RAYMOND F. HOPKINS*

Warren F. Ilchman and Norman T. Uphoff, The Political Economy of
Change. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1969, 316 pp. $8.50.
Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., Rebellion and Authority. Chicago,
Markham Publishing Co., 1970, 174 pp. $6.95.
W. Howard Wriggins, The Ruler's Imperative. New York, Columbia University Press, 1969, 275 pp. $10.00.

ALTHOUGH the literature on political development has been re.Il.markably insightful, hopes for a science of "nation-building" have
not been realized. While numerous works have described the effects of
traditional patterns, ethnic and linguistic cleavages, and rapid mobilization, and have investigated factors such as culture, bureaucracy, ideology, and parties, we have learned very little about how to alter favorably
the political conditions these have fostered.1 Political scientists, more
often than not, have documented obstacles to, and failures in, political
change desired by leaders in new states, rather than explored strategies
whereby such change might be realized.
The three books under review here move toward filling this gap.
In a manner reminiscent of Machiavelli, they focus upon strategies of
leadership for maintaining or building authority.2 Political scientists,
argue Ilchman and Uphoff, have developed macro-theories useful for
explanations and descriptions, but not suited for policy evaluation. They
propose an approach that treats government policies as independent
variables which can be assessed as to the productivity of their conse-

* I am grateful to Ruth Collier, Harry Harding, Donald Rothchild, and Kenneth
Prewitt who read and commented upon an earlier draft of this article, and to the International Development Research Center at Indiana University who supported my research and study in 1971.
1 See, for instance, Lucian W. Pye, ed., Communications and Political Development
(Princeton 1960); Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge 1966, rev. ed.); Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton 1965); David Apter, The Politics of Modernization
(Chicago 1965); and Dankwart Rustow, A World of Nations (Washington 1967), as
well as numerous country studies.
2 Both Ilchman/Uphoff and Wriggins note the similarity of their analytical posture
to that of Machiavelli.
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quences. In a similar but more homely fashion, Wriggins' approach is
to explore the policy perspective of the president or prime minister, as
he puts it, by looking "out his window to see his problems as he sees
them" (p. 5); Leites and Wolf focus more narrowly on the contest for
supremacy between an established authority and a rebellious group. All
three raise the question of how authority is built. As Wriggins states
the case, this is the fundamental task, the imperative for a ruler. Each
examines constraints and pressures under which established leaders may
find themselves, and then analyzes and evaluates the effectiveness of
alternative strategies of resource allocation.
I. A

MoDEL oF EXECUTIVE STRATEGY

Although Ilchman's and Uphoff's The Political Economy of Change
is the most ambitious and comprehensive of the works, all three have a
number of the characteristics of a general model of executive strategy
in common. I shall elaborate this composite model briefly, discuss
some problems it raises for analysis, and then explore the role of legitimacy and support for establishing authority.
Ilchman and Uphoff present a conceptual framework for political
analysis based on an extended analogy from economics. In presenting
their model, the authors use terms drawn from macroeconomic theory,
such as investment, productivity, interest, sector, and inflation. "Political economy" involves exchanges between a regime and its sectors
that determine the increase or decrease in political resources available
to a regime and its populace over time. Following the analogy from
economics, then, a regime may accumulate resources by saving or investing them, and may secure needed resources, such as taxes, from business, labor, and other "sectors," in exchange for regime resources such
as authority, status, or the abstention from coercion. The focus on the
economics of authority and upon "choice" leads to considerations of the
costs and benefits of a particular strategy. The authors claim that policies derived from their analytical framework will prove more useful
than those derived from studies cast within the framework of political
culture or socialization, since the latter frequently are unable to forecast
the costs and benefits in the various decisions facing "statesmen."
Wriggins' The Ruler's Imperative, in contrast to the Ilchman/Uphoff
volume, is written in a readable and jargon-free style useful for introductory courses. Wriggins lists eight strategies for "aggregating power"
commonly used by a ruler "to rally support for himself so that he can
stay in power long enough and with sufficient capability . . . [to] get
things done" (p. 5). These range from the appeal of personality to the
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strengthening of a party. Such strategies used by leaders in "emerging
Africa and Asia" are delimited partly by the weak authority and fragmented social systems of these societies. Wriggins' discussion of this
political context and the goals of the leadership in new states is a succinct summary of conventional wisdom. He describes a variety of "social
or organizational groups" including the bureaucracy, land owners, and
trade unions, whose support or opposition may be critical for the success
of a leader, but he ignores class conflicts and the inter-generational transfer of wealth that may act as constraints on political action.
His eight strategies are described in terms of their costs and benefits,
but only in the most general fashion. Relationships of one strategy to
another are glossed over, and the strategies lack the qualities of a typology such as mutual exclusiveness or exhaustiveness. As a result, in his
concluding chapter on strategic mixes, Wriggins can do little more
than list some of the assets and liabilities of each strategy. His propositions about their employment have the unfalsifiable quality of an astrologer's advice. For instance, he states that a leader will project his personality because doing so is easy, ambiguous ( and therefore capable of
wide appeal), and expected (for African and Asian states are charismahungry). On the other hand, Wriggins states that a wise leader will not
over-use this strategy; it can be risky, since the emotions it evokes are
volatile and the diminution of its returns set in fairly rapidly.
The study of rebellion and authority by Leites and Wolf focuses upon
the strategies used to maintain or challenge authority. In pursuing
their goal to move "the discussion of insurgent conflict toward the level
that has been attained in the better discussions of nuclear conflict" (p.
v) they attempt to increase their rigor and precision by using the vocabulary of economic analysis. They advocate a "systems" approach
that examines the supply and demand of inputs needed by authorities
and rebellions, in preference to the conventional "hearts and minds"
theory of insurgency which holds that insurgents have their principal
basis of support in the affections of the populace.
Leites and Wolf illustrate rather than test their propositions by using
examples drawn largely from third-world conflicts such as those in
Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and the Middle East. Their main
point is that rebellions are not dependent upon popular support, but
rather upon securing the resources, both internally and from abroad,
that are needed to maintain and expand their operations. A small leadership cadre with adequate resources can, even if it is unpopular and
few share its ideology, expand its extractive capability and secure compliance. Caught in a struggle for control of the authority structure, the
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populace may be more motivated by profit-maximization or by damagelimiting goals than by abstract loyalty.
The model of executive authority that can be extracted from these
books contains categories of variables that are roughly equivalent: rulers ( or the executive), ruled, resources, and goals. Table I summarizes
these. Executives pursue goals, the primary one being the maintenance
of authority, by investing and spending resources in various combinations of strategies including the buying or coercing of support. Leites
and Wolf do not disaggregate variables to the extent the others do because their focus is narrower. Ilchman and Uphoff distinguish another
category of variables, "political infrastructure," which includes parties,
elections bureaucracy, and information systems. Since the others discuss
these phenomena as strategies, this distinction may be unnecessary. 8
Within this general framework a variety of partial analyses can be
undertaken, including the struggle between an authority and a rebellious group, such as that discussed throughout by Leites and Wolf ( and
by Ilchman and Uphoff, pp. 44-45). In competing for power, exchanges
between a sector ( or a coalition of sectors) and those in authority often
attempt to destroy each other's resources rather than to increase them.
However, the same general cost/benefit frame of analysis can be used
for investigating these non-productive cases.
What benefits can we expect to derive from the analytical posture of
the approaches outlined in the three books, and what costs might be
entailed? Some benefits seem clear-notably the role that their common emphasis upon executive leadership can play in making more
productive and satisfying political choices. By evaluating the consequences of various strategies and tactics with respect to values, resources,
and relevant groups, more efficient ways to achieve goals might be
charted and insights might be obtained into the problem of establishing
authority, as viewed from the top.4
In using this approach, however, one encounters certain limitations,
difficult choices, and ambiguities that need to be considered in weighing
its merits. I shall not comment on all of these, but rather shall focus on
six of them: ( 1) the conservative nature of the ruler's viewpoint, ( 2)
8 Moreover, infrastructure for them is only an analytical distinction from that of
resources; consequently, conceptual overlaps and confusion are possible. "The fact
that the line between resource and infrastructure cannot always be discerned should
not cause undue concern, since the distinction is ultimately an analytical one" (p. 73).
Some of the items they label infrastructure might be considered part of the regime,
e.g., legislatures and police; others might be included among sectors, e.g., political
parties; still others might be counted as resources, e.g., ideology.
4 Leites and Wolf, for instance, have numerous suggestions about how authorities
might more effectively counter insurgencies.
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TABLE

I5

Ilchman/Uphoff

Wriggins

Leites/Wolf

Rulers

Regime

Leader

Authority

Ruled

Sectors
Groups
feudal land owners bureaucracy
middle peasantry
military
money lenders
traditional
landless laborers
attachments
teachers
landowners
regionalists
students/intelmerchants
lectuals
military
businessmen
civil servants,
trade unions
etc.
media elite
Anti-statesmen

Population
in rebellion
regular populace

Resources

Goods and Services
Status
Information
Force
Legitimacy
Authority

None listed explicitly, though a
variety are mentioned in discussing strategies,
e.g., jobs, police,
skilled personnel,
social recognition, etc.

People
Food
Material
Information
Efficiency
leadership
discipline

Goals

Stay in power: present and future
Cope with and induce social and
economic change
Build up political
infrastructure

Legitimacy
Independence
National unity
Social transfor mation
Economic <levelopment
Association in
wider political
body

Maintain and
harden authority
Counter rebellions
Strengthen productive capacity

the question of short- versus long-term analyses, (3) the types of resources, (4) the question of disaggregation, (5) internal and external
exchanges, and ( 6) confusion between costs and ethics.
Taking the viewpoint of those in authority has an inherent conservative bias since their sine qua non is preservation of their position of
5 Categories of ruled are discussed in Ilchman and Uphoff, p. 40, and Wriggins, pp.
60-88; resources are described in Ilchman and Uphoff, pp. 58--91, and Leites and Wolf,
pp. 32-42.
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power. This need not be deplored, but it should be recognized. Any
policy-oriented inquiry probably must begin with this assumption as a
constraint in assessing alternatives. The result is that more "radical"
social analyses and emphases on change are less likely to emerge, while
law and order will usually be considered an important value. Leadership
strategies tend to be regime-building rather than nation-building. Thus,
in exchanges with the populace, a high priority is placed on consequences for the regime rather than for the society. Although in many
instances these may not conflict, some policies drawn up with the clear
purpose of strengthening the coalition that most strongly supports the
government may create social discontent by fostering a bourgeoisie
that is loyal but is disliked by the populace, or by antagonizing groups
outside the core coalition. (Menderes did this to the previously favored
urban and modern sector of the population in Turkey when he adopted
policies popular among peasants.)
Wriggins is less self-conscious about, and less conscious of, this regime bias than the others, perhaps because he has more explicitly assumed the perspective of the political leader. The other authors deny
that a bias exists in their analysis. Ilchman and Uphoff assert that their
study is as relevant "to the choices made by revolutionaries as it is to
those made by authorities" (p. 29), and Leites and Wolf maintain that
they have tried to consider both the viewpoints of rebellion and of authority. But both admit that their presentations may not be balanced.
Leites and Wolf, for example, state "sometimes the posture of the authority and, specifically, of U.S. policy in relation to authority, is adopted
more completely than perfect balance would warrant" (p. vii). Any
apparent preference for established authority is attributed to the exigencies of presentation rather than inherent bias. 6 Yet in spite of these
explicit assertions, the tone and emphasis of the authors' analyses make
it difficult to accept their statement. Ilchman and Uphoff label a group
seeking to gain authority as "the anti-statesmen"-not a particularly
neutral term. Furthermore, they make no distinction between those in
authority roles and the role structure itself. Thus the anti-statesman,
whether competing in an election or a revolution, is a pure antagonist
of authority (p. 186), and possibilities for a change of personnel are
presented in a harsh and overdrawn fashion. Lyndon Johnson, among
others, has been accused of equating attacks upon himself with attacks
upon the Presidency; surely this confusion should not be encouraged
in a sophisticated framework for analysis. That it is, is due to Ilchman's
8 Ilchman and Uphoff assert that their "restricted focus on the statesman's choices
has been a matter of exposition rather than a matter of ethics" (p. 282).

This content downloaded from
130.58.34.f:ffff:ffff:ffff on Thu, 01 Jan 1976 12:34:56 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

SECURING AUTHORITY

277

and Uphoff's simplifying assumption that all authority belongs to the
regime, their treatment of a regime as monolithic rather than as composed of factions or disaggregate entities such as a legislature or contentious groups within a cabinet, and their equation of regime structure
with individual role occupants ( an equation that Wriggins also usually makes).
Similar! y, Leites and Wolf focus on the rebellious tactics of violence
and coercion rather than on the strategies of Gandhi, Lenin, or Nyerere who effectively used a withdrawal of legitimacy. When a change
requires structural alterations first, those in authority frequently oppose
it, although it may be desirable from some other perspectives. Moreover,
their equation of campus rebellions with those in Vietnam and elsewhere, and their emphasis on rebel tactics of lawlessness and terror make
the reader feel that Leites and Wolf have little sympathy with rebels,
in spite of their profession of equal empathy. Even where leaders are
consciously attempting to bring about structural transformation, as in
China and Tanzania, the goals of maintaining power and social redefinition may conflict, although in such cases maintaining authority
may be a requisite for serious change.
The second major consideration that emerges from these analyses is
the trade-off between long-term and short-term strategies. In spite of
Keynes' well-known dictum about the long run, the arguments for
pursuing short-term rather than long-term policies are not fully convincing. As we begin to recognize that the effects of political and social
policies may accumulate relatively unnoticed until they suddenly become visible upon crossing a threshold, or that lags may occur in the
effects of any policy so that short-term positive outcomes may eventually be outweighed by long-term losses, the need to consider both shortand long-term effects becomes clear.
Wriggins counsels against strategies that have rapidly diminishing
returns after a short period; but Ilchman/Uphoff and Leites/Wolf explicitly favor short-term policies. The strategies a leader may pursue are
frequently interchangeable and, as Wriggins argues, the shorter his
time-perspective and the more focused his goal toward simply staying
in power, the more indifferent he will probably be toward the strategies he uses; any of them will help secure this short-term, albeit fundamental, goal. However, in the case of leaders who have long-run purposes, strategies must be examined more critically, and the costs and
benefits weighed more carefully, with respect to their consequences
over a number of years.
Ilchman and Uphoff take the opposite view, arguing that a shortThis content downloaded from
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term perspective is more realistic, less risky, and likely to yield quicker
returns (pp. 260-272). Probably Leites and Wolf emphasize short-term
strategies because of their focus on conflict situations where long-term
considerations are frequently irrelevant. In situations where legitimacy
is weak initially, such a short time perspective may be appropriate. But
the manipulative tactics that are encouraged by such a perspective tend
to depreciate in effectiveness. The popularity of leaders who enjoy the
privileges of a former, foreign elite can dissipate quickly; those intimidated by threats of coercion may find that their tolerance for violence
increases over time, so that their compliance can be secured only by
increasing demonstrations of repressive force. Thus, coercion and the
appeal of a popular or charismatic personality tend to have short-run
benefits, but they have dangerous potentials for the long run. On the
other hand, building a party can bolster authority over longer periods
-even through successive changes in the legitimizing ideology of the
political system.7
A third feature of the model which raises questions for analysis is the
nature of resources. Some resources are said to be relatively constant,
so that competition over their allocation resembles a zero-sum game.
Status, power, and information all are considered to decline in value
if they are widely shared (Wriggins, p. 29; Ilchman/Uphoff, pp. 60-70,
mo, 178). This interpretation emphasizes the distributive rather than
the productive quality of resources and the resultant intense competition. Other resources, in contrast, such as goods or services, are seen
as expandable rather than "relational." But is it empirically true that
one can gain status or authority only at the expense of another? I think
not. "Relational resources" may be increased by expanding the number
of positions of status or authority, by enlarging their scope, or by increasing their value (which frequently results when wider participation expands demand). Although the norms in various societies can
more or less keep resources constant, only a narrow definition fostered
by a zero-sum mentality requires certain resources to be merely "relational."8
Another question concerning resources is what should be included
as a resource. Wriggins, for instance, emphasizes the importance of individuals as a factor in developing strategies and managing resources.
He states that "to generalize without close appraisal of the personal
7 See Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds., Authoritarian Politics in
Modern Society (New York 1970), especially Moore's essay, 48-6o.
8 For example, Jack Potter and others, eds., Peasant Society (Boston 1967), especially
the essay by George Foster on the notion of the "Limited Good," which describes how
economic goods are treated as a zero-sum resource in some societies, 300-323.
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characteristics of specific leaders invites easy error" (p. 12). The value
hierarchies of "statesmen" are considered important by Ilchman and
Uphoff in determining "rational" strategies, and Leites and Wolf note
the value that insurgencies derive from the frequent austerity of their
leadership and from its ability to use calculated and discriminating
violence, but neither recommend analyzing the differences that individuals can make upon strategies that are being pursued. From a macroperspective the impact of an individual personality may not be large
enough to warrant its inclusion in the analysis. Nevertheless, it seems
likely that in situations where precedents are lacking, not only the preferences of a leader or set of leaders will be important in shaping policy,
but also their individual skills. Ilchman and Uphoff write, "a statesman
( or anti-statesman) does not win conflicts over authority and policy
solely on the basis of his resource position. His skill at resource management counts as well" (p. 16i). Personal skills of leaders, whether those
of a Hitler-like propagandist or an intelligent social analyst, might also
be counted as resources within the model.
The number and complexity of disaggregations is the fourth problem
in a model of executive strategy. Since reality is complex, a large number of distinctions can be made. But the more distinctions one includes
in the model, the more difficult it is to measure and relate the resulting
variables. Leites and Wolf make few distinctions, separating out as
actors only a populace caught between the two extreme competitors of
authority and rebellion. Although a number of sub-populations having
different responses could be distinguished, these disaggregations are not
necessary for their purposes.
On the other hand, W rig gins, and especially Ilchman and Uphoff,
propose a multitude of distinctions and variables. Since W riggins'
presentation is less formal, aimed primarily at description, a good bit
of underbrush must be cleared away before his work can be used with
quantitative data. Ilchman and Uphoff's heavily theoretical presentation
is complicated by their elaborate disaggregations. "Currencies" such as
support and allegiance are distinguished from resources, sectors are
overlapping and extensive in number, and similar processes are given
different labels. For instance, mobilizing a sector-that is, increasing
its awareness, importance, and influence-and building an infrastructure
may be analyzed in identical terms. As a result, their verbal distinctions
far exceed their capacity to measure or test. We are told that the absence
of empirical data and measures is due largely to their desire to publish
a manageable theoretical book (see pp. 74, 273), and that empirical
work that would operationalize their model, and measure its variables,
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is under way and will soon be forthcoming. However, until such operationalized tests of their model prove me wrong, I suspect that many
of their variables may be too disaggregated, too complex, and too ambiguous to be measured. As a result, we have more a verbal paradigm
than a model. If Ilchman and Uphoff had attempted to build a formal
model, as is done, for instance, in computer simulations, I am sure their
complex distinctions would have been abandoned in favor of fewer,
more critical disaggregations. In such a model it is important to keep
disaggregations at a minimum, choosing a strategy that maximizes the
explanatory capacity of a manageable number of variables. It is possible
to represent a number of complex relationships and to evaluate the implications of various policies in a fairly simple twelve-equation model
of politics and economics, as the work of Brunner and Brewer has
shown. 9 In constructing a model, critical simplifications help organize
complexity more usefully than adding refinements and disaggregations.
Perhaps the general framework and the complex verbal components of
The Political Economy of Change can serve best to clarify choices in
building models, especially those that explore a single policy area or
set of exchanges.
The relation between internal and external transactions is the fifth
important point raised in these volumes. Leites and Wolf stress the important role that "exogenous" inputs such as foreign support and supplies play in a rebellion. W riggins cites foreign policy as one major
strategy tool for leaders. However, he warns of the disadvantages of
foreign inputs. "Resources from abroad ... may subject the regime to
accusations of failing to protect national integrity and independence"
(p. 257). Ilchman and Uphoff include "external governments" as "sectors" and agree with W riggins that these may donate resources, including legitimacy, to a regime (p. 47; Wriggins p. 228).
Although they recognize the importance of foreign inputs, all three
books ignore serious and, among third-world states, highly salient questions of foreign transfers, namely imperialism and neo-colonialism.
In a number of third-world states, conservative oligarchies are assisted
in retaining power by external transactions with both governmental
and non-governmental agencies, while foreign corporations maintain
control over large areas of economic decision-making. Such control
can be pervasive and difficult to avoid. 10
9 See Ronald D. Brunner and Garry D. Brewer, Organized
Theories of Political Development (New York r97r).
10 Even in a "radical" state such as Tanzania, the price and
portant export items, pyrethrum, are determined by one firm
ganyika Extract Company (TECO) limits output, yet controls
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A model focusing on political leadership could clarify and pinpoint
many of the fuzzy areas in theories about imperialism in its many
forms, and provide a useful framework for gathering data to test these
theories. However, a study that documented the exchanges between a
regime and foreign agencies, no matter how valuable a guide to policy
it might be, would be encouraged by few governments. Since data for
such a study would be difficult to amass without the encouragement and
cooperation of policy-makers, such an inquiry is unlikely.
This observation relates to the last question concerning the analytical model that the authors have in common, namely the role of ethics
and choice in policy analysis. Some policy inquiries may require a costing of strategies that would result in serious deprivations for some
groups currently rewarded by authority. Most "statesmen" are not
receptive to policy inquiries that run counter to their own predispositions or involve severe deprivations for a group within their coalition.
What role can a social scientist play in a regime whose goals and values
foreclose consideration of certain relevant policy alternatives, or whose
values would be deplored by most social scientists?
This question of ethics in policy choices is the final problem to which
Ilchman and Uphoff address themselves. If we assume that alternatives
should be weighed on a cost/benefit basis, how are alternative strategies
to be evaluated? For what benefits is one willing to use massive violence
to pursue a successful rebellion, or a counter-insurgency operation? To
what end could Leites and Wolf justify building the intelligence systems they describe, which resemble those used by South Africa and Nazi
Germany, to monitor and crush opposition? Whose values does one use
in determining the "cost" of various alternatives?
Aside from the underlying goal of maintaining authority, two of the
books ignore the relationship between strategy and substantive goals.
Wriggins fails to relate his eight strategies or tactics to his list of goals.
Leites and Wolf simply exclude goals other than survival, except to
note the extra burden such responsibilities can impose on authorities.
Ilchman and Uphoff, on the other hand, tackle the problem theoretically, claiming that with their model "it should be possible to impute
the costs and consequences of policy choices, after which ethical and
intelligent judgments could then be made" (pp. 282-83, italics added).
An intelligent analysis of consequences, they argue, improves ethical
considerations by clarifying costs and benefits of choices. Such a posias a result, the local market value of pyrethrum flowers declined by 45 per cent. I am
indebted to Idrian Resnick, economist in the Tanzanian Ministry of Development
Planning, for pointing this out.
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tion ignores the fact that the operation of calculating costs and benefits
involves basic normative or ethical considerations. One cannot postpone these until after cost has been determined, since normative assumptions are made in constructing measures for pricing and predicting
consequences of policies. Realizing this, we could begin to add some of
the classical political values-such as equality, freedom, and justice,
which are notably absent from the analysis in all three volumes-to the
measures of exchange in the model.11
II.

LEGITIMACY, SUPPORT, AND AUTHORITY

Perhaps the central element underlying the permanent establishment
of authority is legitimacy. Political legitimacy refers to the degree to
which the exercise of political authority, by individuals through a set
of institutions, is regarded as right or appropriate.12 What clearly distinguishes authority from coercion and force on the one hand, and
"leadership" on the other, is legitimacy.13
All three volumes recognize the importance of legitimacy, although
only Ilchman and Uphoff explicitly discuss it at length. According to
Wriggins, legitimacy is the first goal sought by new leaders who, "having legitimacy ... are assured of their authority" (p. 39). A principal
concern of Leites' and Wolf's study is "how to maintain and strengthen" authority, which they define as the "legal and legitimized right and
capacity to command" (p. 4).
In rapidly changing societies, especially ones with new regimes,
legitimacy is frequently weak or eroded. On this point all three books
agree. As a result, authority tends to be vulnerable. On the other hand,
a large portion of the population is usually politically distant from the
central regime, and, compared to states which have completed social
mobilization,1"' fewer exchanges occur between center and periphery.
For a regime's "legitimacy must be acknowledged not just by citizens,
but, more importantly, also by those who control other valued re11 These concerns need not be excluded from the rigorous analysis imposed by the
discipline of "political economy." See, for instance, the article by Thomas Gale Moore,
"An Economic Analysis of the Concept of Freedom," fournal of Political Economy,
Lxxvu (July/August 1969), 532-42. Curiously, articles from this journal are nowhere
cited by Ilchman and Uphoff.
12 For a discussion of legitimacy, see Dolf Sternberger, "Legitimacy" in David Sills,
ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, IX (New York 1968), 244-48;
and David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York 1965), 348-72.
18 Robert L. Peabody, "Authority," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,
I (fn. 12), 473-76.
14 This term is used by Karl Deutsch to describe the effects of literacy, urbanization,
industrialization, and other aspects of modernity upon society. See K. W. Deutsch,
"Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review,
LV (September 1961), 493-514.
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sources." 15 Thus, the legitimation of authority is critical in the mobilized sector of a society, while the residual or more traditional sector
remains apart and largely passive, accepting the "modern" government
for whatever traditional symbols it retains and simply because it is
there. 16
Legitimacy is an attribute ascribed by individuals and groups to the
governing process in which they live. 11 Moreover, it is a continuous
rather than a dichotomous variable, fluctuating over time. It is composed of hundreds of evaluations made by individuals and groups regarding the actions of the authority structure, both past and future.
Principles held by individuals concerning the policies, personnel, and
procedures that are right or appropriate for a regime may be based on
a mixture of influences, such as religion or precedent, that are seldom
explicit, consistent, or easily articulated. Such principles can check a
regime's prerogatives and limit the alternatives it can pursue since, if
a regime wishes to retain legitimacy, its policies and procedures must
be largely in accord with the normative expectations of the populace.
To be sure, legitimacy is difficult to measure. Ilchman and Uphoff
suggest it might be measured as the amount of compliance and support that a regime enjoys after the effects of coercion and other inducements have been accounted for. Similarly, Fred Riggs notes that "we
find people-citizens, bureaucrats, and others-who show a willingness
to follow instructions . . . [when neither immediate reward, coercion,
expertise, or solidarity] motives are present. This willingness involves
legitimacy.ms Operational tests to calibrate this residual willingness to
comply would require enormous skill and imagination, since legitimacy
and compliance may be only weakly related, especially when the sanctions commanded by a regime to enforce its rule are numerous and
effective. Moreover, a focus on compliance behavior as a manifest consequence of legitimacy directs our attention away from the phenomenon
of legitimacy itself, and muddles the concept. Essentially, the political
legitimacy of a regime is found and best measured in the attitudes of
a population toward its regime. Compliance behavior and attitudes of
support should be treated as distinct, although interdependent, variables.19
15 Peabody (fn. 13).
16 See Fred Riggs, "Administration

and a Changing World Environment," Public
Administration Review, xxvm (July 1968) on this point.
17 This is similar to the categorization used by Richard M. Merelman, "Learning
and Legitimacy," American Political Science Review, LX (September 1966), 548-61.
18 Riggs (fn. 16).
10 In the last decade dozens of articles and books have repeatedly referred to legitimacy. In most cases, however, no careful analysis for clarifying the concept was
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Legitimacy is a nettlesome concept, and it is easy to disagree over
how it relates to other aspects of the political process. Nevertheless, two
propositions about legitimacy that are advanced by Ilchman and Uphoff seem erroneous and should not be allowed to pass. First, the authors
assert that "it is possible, at least in theory, that occupants of authority
roles could have no legitimacy whatsoever. With enough other resources, compliance with public policies might still be secured" (p. 81).
But with no legitimacy, it would seem to be an error in semantics to
say that a regime had authority. Authority is legitimized power according to many standard definitions (including that of Leites and
Wolf), and occupants of authority roles in a regime ( or in a business,
trade union, or church, for that matter) would have to have at least
some legitimacy. 20
The second assertion by Ilchman and Uphoff that seems questionable
is that support freely given may "be freely withdrawn," while support
that is coerced or bought may be more stable (p. 79). This is reminiscent
of Machiavelli's dictum that between fear and love as the basis for a
prince's rule, fear is the more reliable. However, support that is based
on legitimacy is freely given and is more stable than coerced or bought
support, which is likely to disappear wherever the regime is short on
inducements. Such support, engendered by legitimacy, is less readily
affected, since legitimacy is based on slowly changing norms and accumulated evaluations.
Similarly, Leites and Wolf argue that supply (resources) is more important than demand (popularity) in establishing authority. "The
progress made by each side in the conflict influences the affiliations of
most of the population as much as or more than it is influenced by those
affiliations" (p. 151). But substitution of other resources for legitimacy
can lead to a dangerous deflationary spiral that prompts insurrection.
As Eric Nordlinger suggests, "once governments rely upon force, they
tend to overreact to demands with the application of excessive force;
the value of organizations with force at their disposal ( the army and
the police) is heightened; there is consequently a further loss of legitipresented, and an empirical investigation of the phenomenon was rarer still. For instance, a most extensive research effort by David Easton and Jack Dennis, Children
in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy (New York 1969) focused only
on the acquisition of attitudes of "diffuse support" (Easton's definition of legitimacy)
by children, and used few if any questions which relate directly to "the general idea
of legitimacy," namely, the ethical acceptability of government ( see p. 414).
20 When legitimacy is quite low, authority becomes naked power, whereas when
other resources vanish, authority is merely formal, not effective. Harold D. Lasswell
and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven 1950), 135-41.
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macy; and finally the population itself turns to violence...." 21 While
some regimes with low legitimacy may retain authority by using a great
deal of coercion, few (perhaps Haiti) have survived over a long period
without using other strategies. On the other hand, regimes with high
legitimacy can generate support freely given, without a quid pro quo
(see Ilchman and Uphoff, p. 74).
The position of legitimacy within the exchanges between a regime
and the populace is outlined in Figure r. The downward arrows indicate the regime's outputs that serve as objects for response and evaluation, and the upward arrows illustrate "flows" of legitimacy, compliance, and support. Legitimacy may be accorded to the personnel, policies, or procedures of a regime. While a particular government action
might initially contravene expectations, so that a large part of the
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population would feel that it was wrong, it might be accepted as legitimate, provided most other actions were seen as rightful. An overflow
from these other legitimate acts could legitimize the action, possibly
altering norms. If the government is generally trusted to do what is
right, a few questionable actions may not affect overall legitimacy. 22
Figure I illustrates how the populace evaluates the effects of a regime's activity: through the appeal of its personnel, the costs and benefits of its policies, and the justice of its procedures. It may calculate
"rationally" that it is to its advantage to comply with and support the
regime, entering into what Ilchman and Uphoff refer to as "mutually
beneficial exchanges." The effect upon support would be fairly immediate. But this calculation is essentially separate from the legitimation
process, and is shown only because legitimacy affects similar variables,
namely compliance and support. The legitimacy exchange illustrated
involves a greater lag in response, as the government's actions affect
the level of legitimacy.
Changes in principles or ideas about what is rightful for government
are shown (hypothesized) to be based on the interaction of two variables. One is the degree of satisfaction with the policies of a regime;
the other, a conglomerate and exogenous factor, is one's store of values
based on experience in daily social, economic, and cultural activities.
Social mobilization tends to alter this latter variable, creating new
values and ideas about political participation and rights and the range
of personal needs for which government is responsible. Changes in
these two variables ( and expanded demands on government may reduce policy satisfaction, although policies are unchanged) affect the
evaluation process by eroding old ideas of what are just procedures
on the part of leaders, and reinforcing those that conform to current
values. The impact of mobilization and modernization upon values
has altered the normative structure of societies, slowly eroding transcendental justifications of authority. Nevertheless, because legitimacy generally changes rather slowly, it can dampen the effects that fluctuations
in performance may have upon support.
Four strategies for increasing legitimacy, and consequently support,
are mentioned in the books under discussion: pursuit of satisfactory
policies, possession of effective power, responsive action, and the shaping
of normative structure. Ilchman and Uphoff state, "to acquire and
22 See William A. Gamson, Power and Discontent (Homewood, Ill. 1968), 45-54,
whose concept of "generalized trust" parallels that of Easton's idea of "diffuse support" and may be related to legitimacy. A government is more likely to be seen as
legitimate when one trusts that it will do what it should do, and there is a high
probability of preferred outcomes being achieved.
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maintain legitimacy the statesman or anti-statesman must confer benefits ••.. Sectors will not grant legitimacy to the regime unless the regime in turn in some way enhances their well-being" (p. 74). The
provision of desired benefits is similar to the strategy for building legitimacy suggested by Seymour Lipset. He states, "prolonged effectiveness
over a number of generations may give legitimacy to a political system.
In the modern world, such effectiveness means primarily constant economic development." 23 Another form of effectiveness considered more
by Hobbes than by Lipset is the ability to maintain compliance through
the judicious application of force. Force, rather than positive incentives,
is usually considered an inefficient way to maintain a regime and hence
is generally associated with regimes that lack legitimacy. However, the
ability to deal out negative reinforcements to individuals who fail to
comply with the regulations of the regime may also be an important
source of effectiveness.
The second strategy by which a regime may gain legitimacy is by
having the support of powerful sectors of society. This strategy is apparently the one Wriggins would recommend. Although he lists legitimacy as the first goal of leaders, he ignores legitimacy in his concluding section which relates strategy to goals. However, he does conclude
that without building an "aggregation of power," "governance is impossible" (p. 263); Wriggins only briefly elaborates on this central concept, suggesting that aggregation entails acquiring the support of "individuals and groups who have power over still others" (p. 8). Since
all of his eight strategies are supposed to help in aggregating power,
their success presumably should aid in creating legitimacy.
Arthur Stinchcombe has suggested that "a power is legitimate to the
degree that, by virtue of the doctrines and norms by which it is justified,
the power-holder can call upon sufficient other centers of power, as
reserves in case of need, to make his power effective." 24 From this Richard Flacks concludes that we may "predict that individuals will tend
to perceive the action of an authority as legitimate if that action has
or is likely to have the support of other centers." 25 An individual also
might accept a regime as legitimate on principle even when he did
not like or trust it, if he felt most others accepted it as legitimate. Evidence of failure of officials in the regime or in other key institutions
to support national authority would be a clear sign of eroding legitiSeymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, N.Y. 1960), 70.
Arthur Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (New York 1968), 162, cited
in Richard Flacks, "Protest or Conform: Some Social Psychological Perspectives on
Legitimacy," Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, v, No. 2 (196g), 134.
25 Richard Flacks, ibid.
23

H
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macy. Conversely, if the populace perceived that key sectors accord
legitimacy to a regime and make themselves available to help implement its policies, their "demonstration effect" should maintain legitimacy even when public opinion shifts against current office holders.
A third strategy for increasing legitimacy is responsiveness to expectations of right and justice. In more traditional society, rules grounded
in religious doctrine could check a ruler's power and insure that his
conformity to procedures and policies was responsive to the fairly limited and static needs and expectations of the populace. In modern society, various legitimizing principles have evolved to replace traditional
ones. These doctrines usually aim at insuring responsiveness of regimes
and avoiding tyranny. They nearly always include some notion of popular sovereignty and, frequently, means of protecting minorities. 26 Delegation of authority, limitation of power, and access to and participation
in the decision-making process are perhaps the basic ways to insure a
regime's responsiveness (Ilchman and Uphoff, on pp. 201-02, mention
delegation of authority). This access, participation, and incorporation
of individuals or groups in the regime may insure the desired responsiveness to their needs and values. Elections, legislatures, and local government are common devices to increase responsiveness. Since these
devices tend to check "arbitrary" (illegitimate) power, a regime can
promote its legitimacy by adhering to them. Greater access for individuals and groups to the decision-making process, through these popular mechanisms, is likely to increase negative (corrective) feedback in
the system. Those with a cybernetic view of politics might argue that
structures for participation help solve communications and control
problems; thus, the political doctrines and myths of representation have
been imbued with sanctity because of their efficacy.
Responsiveness may often take the form of symbolic output: a regime
that is ineffective in providing improved living standards or in accumulating force to insure the compliance of subjects may nevertheless
legitimize itself through words rather than deeds. Such a regime, by
symbolic outputs responsive to the sentiments, expectations, and identities of the population, may elevate national self-images and secure support and legitimacy from the population even though, for example,
living standards may be falling.
The fourth strategy for increasing legitimacy aims at shaping a society' s normative structure through manipulation of political doctrines
and formulae. Since the ideology of a populace, in the broad sense of the
26 The Federalist Papers are a classic illustration of the history of the formulation
of such doctrines.
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term used by Robert Lane, 21 contains the norms that determine what is
considered legitimate, strategies to alter the ideological beliefs of a
populace are needed in order to change the range of the legitimate use
of power by authorities. Such strategies might involve using various
agencies, such as the educational system, the press, or a political party to
communicate new ideology which justifies changes in the "political formula" or myths that define accepted practices for a regime. 28 The introduction of new ideological components, either sui generis or by adoption from abroad, is a strategy frequently used in developing states to
change the content of legitimacy norms (see Wriggins, pp. 129-44 and
Ilchman/Uphoff, pp. 239-41). Such forms of "legitimacy investments"
involve manipulating the normative structure (Ilchman and Uphoff,
p. 201). For instance, Donald Rothchild suggests that in Kenya the
regime might "move to the left" in order to increase its legitimacy
through the popularity which leftist egalitarian doctrines could generate.29
If the anticipated consequences on legitimacy were included when
alternative strategies are weighed, better, more realistic policy assessments would result. The effects of legitimacy are quite tangible, but
they often are long-term and overlooked. The Vietnam war, for instance, may have affected legitimacy within the United States, perhaps
with consequences for several decades, owing to its special impact on
people at impressionable ages-much as the depression of the 193o's
had lasting effects on an earlier generation. Greater attention to legitimation processes could bring such consequences more clearly into focus.
By assessing a regime's level of legitimacy, priorities among policy
alternatives can be more easily determined. If a regime is in dangerously short supply of legitimacy, it may wish to concentrate on actions to
bolster its position; if it has a large stock, it may wish to expend some
of it on policies that will be unpopular in the short run but are likely
to yield high long-run dividends. Where legitimacy is low, manipulation of support is higher and the conditions for challenging a regime's
authority are improved. Wolf suggests that the probability of insurgency
seems to increase with economic development "over a considerable
range" (p. 51). This apparent relationship may result through the effects of legitimacy as an intervening variable. Since economic change
tends to create frustrations and weaken normative order, it is likely
See Robert Lane, Political Ideology (New York 1960).
Kaplan (fn. 20), 126-34.
be a responsiveness strategy. See Donald Rothchild, "Kenya's
Africanization Program: Priorities of Development and Equity," American Political
Science Review, LXIV (September 1970), 753.
27

28 See Lasswell and
29 This might also
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to reduce legitimacy. If so, its effect upon legitimacy may be one of the
reasons why economic change appears to create political unrest and
increase the chances of insurgency.

III.

PoucY STUDIES oF THE FuTuRE

The merits and faults of these works suggest several recommendations for future policy-oriented empirical studies. First, the more analytical frameworks are relevant for the study of any political system,
from the university to the modern nation state, the more useful they
are likely to be. Wriggins' framework, especially, lacks the benefit of
such universal applicability. As his purpose was to discuss politics in
the African-Asian context, this may be an unfair criticism. However, a
study of executive leadership in these environments need not be divorced
from a study of executive leadership in general. A study of authority
maintenance in "more developed" states should be as valuable an exercise as such a study in a "less developed" one, and the categories of
analysis should be similar. Ilchman's and Upho.ff's analysis, for instance,
could have drawn more heavily on examples from developed states,
particularly the United States, for which more data may exist that are
relevant to the variables they wish to measure. Economists have, after
all, had much more success in building models and predicting effects of
policies in the more developed economies.
Second, studies that apply the model of executive strategy might usefully focus on the important areas that executives control. Instances of
imperialism (neo-colonialism) and corruption in third-world states
should be susceptible to analysis since these practices, however defined,
include, or rest upon, the actions of leaders themselves. Among industrialized states, studies of political leadership and "political investment"
strategies should be especially valuable since the resources controlled
by leaders in these states are so great. In such studies, we can more
readily move from a focus on political development that conceals our
political preferences and confines the concepts we use, to a focus on
political change. 30
A third feature of future policy studies should be an emphasis upon
measuring the processes of change. Within the general approach suggested by these books, measures of system performance are needed in
addition to the more specific measures discussed, such as percentage
30 Samuel P. Huntington makes a strong argument for shifting our attention from
viewing the political process in terms of "development" to examining politics in terms
of "change" in his essay, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development, and
Politics," Comparative Politics, m (April 1971), 283-322.
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of voter turnout. For instance, could we calculate, over time, the total
effects of a regime's policies on net national power (perhaps the average value of resources that maintain authority)? Such measurements
could be one of the most critical new areas for imaginative research
and inquiry in the social sciences. Focusing on the macro-effects of an
executive strategy would require a technique for calculating equivalences between different kinds of resources. Ilchman and Uphoff describe such conversion rates between resources, but are unable to suggest how they might be calculated. However, if such measures were
designed, we might be able to examine the gross and net effects of a
particular policy on national resources.
We need empirical applications devoid of unnecessary concepts and
theorizing. Ilchman and Uphoff state that "the more encompassing an
explanation is, the less testable, the less varifiable, and the less certain
it is as a causal explanation, and thus the weaker it is as a basis for prediction and choice" (p. 261). Unfortunately, the analytical frameworks
discussed tend to be so encompassing that manageable research using
selected variables from them will be difficult. Albert Hirschman has
argued that there are hindrances to understanding that accompany a
premature paradigm and high level of generalization. If paradigms or
even extended economic analogies are used without caution, they may
inhibit the flow of insights and understanding of specific contextual
events, and result in mindless theorizing. 31
Finally, ethical considerations can and should play an important role
in the policy sciences. Otherwise, the view from the top tends to be a
bloodless one, dominated by cold calculations of costs and benefits in
a market place of competing interest groups, classes, or sectors, with
one authority acting more in order to preserve itself than to deliver
political goods such as liberty, security, welfare, or justice.32 One can
accept the need for and value of policy research without agreeing with
Ilchman' s and Uphoff' s efficiency criteria of political man. They believe
that wise statesmen are "political," maximizing efficiency in pursuing
"collective ends" (p. 282); but the economy of a leader's choice is not
independent of the ends pursued. Both those whose ends are "collected"
and the content of these ends can affect the efficiency criterion.
Economists, for good or ill, have become regular advisors on domestic
31 Some of the diagrams in Leites and Wolf and the distinctions made by Ilchman
and Uphoff occasionally leave this impression. For the critique of "mindless theorizing"
see Albert 0. Hirschman, "The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understanding," World Politics, XXII (April 1970), 329-43.
32 See J. Roland Pennock, "Political Development, Political Systems, and Political
Goods," World Politics, xvm (April 1966), 415-34.
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policy, while political scientists are seldom consulted.as There is a definite position that could be filled by policy scientists devoted to questions
of political strategy, if political scientists can develop the capacities to
play such a role.a¾ As economically developed societies seem to give
greater attention to questions of value, ethical concerns will increasingly
be considered an important part of policy analysis. Future "political
economists" need not abandon the humanist's concern or relegate it to
the last stage of analysis in developing the quantitative rigor and the
focus on policy choice that a model of executive strategy will require.
33 In the United States, for instance, there is no functional equivalent to the National
Council of Economic Advisors for political policy, at least not one staffed by professional political scientists. Those who serve as advisors in the U.S. or abroad are nearly
always specialists in comparative politics and political development who are asked to
advise on policies of foreign and military strategy, or specialists in public administration and law who are consulted on problems in bureaucratic and agency performance.
One reason for this situation is that until recently there has been little scholarship devoted to planning and policy among professional political scientists.
S¾ James (Samuel) Coleman, at an International Political Science Roundtable on
Quantitative Methods, in Mannheim, Germany, July 5-ro, r97r, suggested that the impending important dispute in political science was likely to be between "political
economists"-that is, a group who seek greater rigor in theoretical models and quantitative techniques-and those "behavioralists" who are satisfied with established data
analysis and descriptive statistical approaches.
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